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In recent years, various Latin American governments have resorted to taxes on bank 
debits and financial transactions as alternative ways of raising revenue. Considerable 
interest has developed in understanding the consequences of such reforms. This paper 
constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model to assess the size of distortions and other 
quantitative implications associated with a transaction tax. The distinctive feature of the 
model is the non-neutrality property of the tax in the sense that it distorts the structure of 
relative prices of intermediate transactions, giving rise to tax “pyramidation.” The 
effective tax rate ultimately borne by the economy is shown to depend on the complexity 
of the transaction structure. Calibrated for Latin America, the model finds that, contrary 
to existing evidence and conventional wisdom, a transaction tax is not a particularly 
burdensome levy in terms of economic growth and efficiency costs. The model also 
shows that if a government can credibly commit itself to an announced two-step reform 
in which it first uses a transaction tax temporarily and then replaces it with any other 
conventional tax, this policy will improve economic welfare relative to a tax reform 
where a consumption tax (or a labor income tax or a capital earnings tax) is exclusively 
used from the start to raise the required additional revenue. 
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A few months before the 2002 collapse of the currency peg, the Argentine government, 
in an attempt to make the Convertibility Plan more credible, passed a series of reforms 
including the introduction of a temporary tax on bank account debit and credit 
transactions. The Colombian government, in the middle of a financial crisis in 1998, 
introduced a temporary tax on transactions conducted through financial intermediaries to 
finance the bailout of mortgage, mutual and state-owned banks. In 1993, the Brazilian 
government created a new temporary tax on financial transactions to provide for 
universal health care coverage, a right given by a constitutional amendment passed in 
1988. In 2002, the Venezuelan government instated a temporary bank debit tax to ease 
pressing budgetary imbalances. Today, all these countries have a form of tax on financial 
transactions in their codes, sometimes on a permanent basis (Colombia), sometimes 
continuously renewed on a temporary basis (Brazil), sometimes scrapped and then 
reinstated (Argentina and Venezuela) and sometimes earmarked for new purposes (e.g., 
Colombia). 
 
Other countries in Latin America have resorted to bank debit taxation in the past. To 
ameliorate the effect of the collapse of world oil prices on the budget, Ecuador abolished 
its income tax system in 1998 and replaced it with a financial transaction tax, in hopes of 
increasing revenue. The income tax was soon reinstated and the transaction tax scrapped 
in 2001. Peru made use of this type of tax at the beginning of the 1990s and a proposal 
for its reintroduction has recently been approved by the government. 
 
Bank debit taxation has had a bumpy ride in the region. After starting with enormous 
design problems that literally shut down foreign exchange, interbank and stock markets 
in some countries, and after numerous reforms directed at converting it into a more 
palatable levy (for instance, by exempting foreign exchange and stock market trades, 
transactions with the central bank, the treasury and other government agencies, 
investment funds, etc.), the most recent versions of the tax have gathered momentum and 
represent an important source of revenue for governments. In 2002, the contribution of 
bank debit taxes to federal government tax revenue came to 12.7% in Venezuela, 9.6% in 
Argentina, 6.1% in Brazil and 5.3% in Colombia. If the yield of other indirect 
“cascading” taxes is added, turnover taxes represent almost 23% of the government’s tax 
revenue in Brazil. 
 
Although there is no more than a handful of empirical studies, the policy debate in the 
region, based on them, has been characterized by unequivocal and definite policy 
statements. According to the literature, a transaction tax is a particularly burdensome levy 
(Albuquerque, 2001a and 2001b; Arbeláez et al., 2002; Coelho et al., 2001; Lozano and 
Ramos, 2000; Koyama and Nakane, 2001), and its costs are higher the longer it remains 
in place (Kirilenko and Summers, 2003; Tanzi, 2000). It is strongly recommended that 
the tax be scrapped soon (Coelho, et al. 2001; IMF, 2000; Tanzi, 2000) and replaced with 
taxes such as the VAT and income taxes (Coelho, et al. 2001). However, the lack of 
theoretical and empirical analyses backing up such statements is surprising. The existing 
literature has not been able to address key issues, such as how a transaction tax distorts   3
the allocation of economic resources, how big the resulting distortion (excess burden) is, 
how badly a transaction tax fares relative to the VAT and income taxes or how the 
economy behaves along the transition path of tax reforms involving changes in the 
transaction tax. This paper attempts to make such analyses, providing quantitative 
answers rather than conjectures. 
 
A bank debit tax is a convoluted object. Albuquerque (2001a; 2001b) and Kirilenko 
and Summers (2003) have approached some of the questions at issue from a narrow 
perspective, understanding it as an excise tax on financial intermediation. In contrast, this 
paper interprets a bank debit tax more broadly, as a transaction tax, and disregards its 
effect on financial intermediation to focus on real resource allocation. A bank debit tax - 
akin to a transaction tax - has features that are similar to conventional taxes like a tax on 
final expenditures, a tax on labor income and a tax on capital earnings, but it also exhibits 
the less desirable features of a turnover tax. These latter features are what make a bank 
debit tax a cascading tax, which is highly objectionable. Long ago, economic theory 
showed that final good taxation is superior to turnover or transaction taxation because it 
avoids production inefficiency (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971). In contrast to a consumer-
consumer (financial) transaction tax and a value-added tax applied to all stages of 
production and distribution, a turnover tax suffers from a non-neutrality property in the 
sense that it distorts the structure of relative prices of intermediate transactions conducted 
on the production side of the economy. This explains the strong preference economic 
theory has for a value-added tax within the class of indirect taxes, and also why policy 
makers and analysts take for granted the superiority, on efficiency grounds, of other tax 
instruments and why little is known about the nature and size of the distortionary effects 
caused by tax “pyramidation.” 
 
This paper introduces into a multisector, dynamic general equilibrium model a 
transaction tax to assess the size of distortions, the effect on economic growth and the 
efficiency costs associated with alternative tax reforms involving a transaction tax. The 
contribution and distinctive feature of the model is the non-neutrality property of the 
modeled tax that gives rise to tax pyramidation. This feature has not been properly 
captured by standard tax models, which typically ignore intermediate transactions and, 
more importantly, unconventional taxes, like a transaction tax. The paper shows that the 
effective tax burden in the economy depends on the complexity of the transaction 
structure. The model also constructs a level playing field in which conventional taxes 
levied on final transactions, such as a consumption tax, and taxes such as labor and 
capital income taxes, on the one hand, and unconventional taxes levied on both final and 
intermediate transactions, on the other, can be judiciously compared. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model, first focusing on the 
properties of transaction taxation and then generalizing it by including consumption, 
labor income and capital earnings taxes. Section 3 explains the parameterization strategy, 
the solution algorithm to compute equilibrium allocations and the metric used to compare 
the effects of alternative tax reforms. Section 4 presents and discusses the main results 
from numerical experiments and performs some robustness checks. Section 5 presents the 
results of additional numerical sensitivity analyses. An effort is made to reconcile the   4
results in this paper with the strikingly opposing conclusions drawn from the existing 
empirical literature in Section 6. Finally, conclusions are contained in Section 7. 
 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
Three general types of transactions are carried out in our economy: one between firms 
conducting intermediate input trade, one between firms and households buying and 
selling capital and labor services and finally, one between firms and households 
exchanging final consumption and investment goods. All these types of transactions are 
intermediated through the financial system and therefore, subject to a bank debit tax, 
which is called hereafter, transaction tax (TT). This means that every single trade taking 
place in either the final good market, or the intermediate good market, or the capital 
market or the labor market is burdened with a TT. The salient feature of a transaction tax 
is its potential to cause distortions in trading patterns through the “pyramiding” of 
nominal rates, i.e., its feature that resembles a turnover tax. In the model economy, this 
feature is captured by taxing intermediate input transactions. Given the assumed 
production structure - to be described shortly - the tax rate will pyramid as a good “turns 
over” from one stage of the production process to the next. 
 
A. Production and Transaction Structures 
 
The production structure is partially inspired by that described by Uribe (1997). There is 
a fixed, though possibly large, number of sectors n in the economy. The first  1 n −  
sectors produce intermediate goods while the final good is produced in the remaining 
sector, called sector number n. It takes n stages to produce a final homogeneous 
consumption-investment good and each stage takes place successively from stage 1 in 
sector  1 to stage n in sector n, within a given time period. Since firms solve static 
problems, the use of time subscripts will be postponed until the time dimension is no 
longer trivial. 
 
The production of the final good in sector n requires, in addition to primary factors - 
capital and labor - an intermediate input produced in sector  1 n − . The production of the 
(intermediate) good number  1 n −  requires in turn primary inputs and material input 
produced in sector  2 n −  whose production in turn requires materials from sector  3 n − , 
in conjunction with capital and labor services, and successively so for the remaining 
sectors. This does not apply to sector number 1, obviously. Sector number 1 production 
technology involves solely primary inputs. All payments on the production side of the 
economy are subject to a transaction tax at a rate of 
T τ . Payments include disbursements 
to pay for primary factor services as well as for the cost of intermediate inputs. This 
simple structure captures the unpleasant feature of a turnover tax: the tendency of the 
nominal rate to pyramid. 
 
Value added in sector i,  i V , is measured as the contribution of primary inputs and 
technology in the production process. In order to have a unique index of value added,   5
Sato (1976) shows that two assumptions are needed: separability and generalized 
homogeneity. Thus, primary inputs and technology are jointly separable from 
intermediate inputs and the production function is homogeneous of degree one in  i V  and 
i M , where  i M  represents intermediate inputs in the production of good i,  n ..., , 2 i = . 
The economy’s technologies satisfy these requirements. The value added function is 





i i H Z K V
− =  where  i K  is capital in place in sector i,  i H  is raw labor input and Z is 
an index of knowledge which is freely available to all sectors and which is acquired 
through learning-by-doing, as a non-deliberate action. Technical change is endogenously 
determined by means of this externality effect. 
 
Gross output  i Y  is produced according to a Leontief technology the arguments of 
which are value added  i V  and material input  i M . As mentioned above, the latter is 
produced in sector  1 i− . The production structure is concisely expressed as 
 
1 1 V Y =  
 
{} n , ... , 2 i M , V min Y i i i = =  
 
In sector number 1 gross output and value added are equal. Let  i p ,  r and w denote 
the relative price of good i, the rental price of capital and the wage rate all in terms of 
the final good. Taking prices parametrically, sector i firm chooses  i K  and  i H  so as to 
maximize after-tax profits, 
 














Sector i firm pays taxes of  ( ) i 1 i M p τ − ⋅
T  on the total transactions conducted in the 
intermediate input market and of  ( ) i i H Z w K r τ + ⋅
T  on trades conducted in primary 
factor markets. From this problem, the following equilibrium pricing functions are 
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and in any other sector i,  1 i ≠ , 
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Both  sets of conditions have the usual interpretation of equating the marginal cost of 
hiring an additional unit of a primary input to the value of its marginal contribution to 
output. In our new twist, the marginal cost includes a transaction tax and, in addition the 
marginal contribution of sectoral primary inputs represent their contribution to a quantum 
index of aggregate value added. Combine first order conditions to get 
 
















an expression that conveys the main message of the separability assumption: the marginal 
rate of substitution between primary inputs is independent of the material input  i M . The 
equation says that all sectors utilize the same capital-labor ratio. This key finding is 
summarized as follows. 
 
Proposition 1. Consider the described production and transaction structures. Then, 
given primary factor prices, capital-labor ratios across the economy are independent of 
the transaction tax rate. 
 
In equilibrium, factor prices are determined endogenously and through this channel a 
TT may exert its distortionary effect on allocations. Identical capital-labor ratios along 





i ∀ =  
i H H
f
i ∀ =  
 
where 
f K  and 
f H  stand for equilibrium factor demands. Aggregating over sectors the 
economy’s demand for capital equals 
f nK and the demand for efficiency units of labor 
totals 
f H Z n.  
 
Proposition 2. Consider the described production structure and Proposition 1. Then, in 
equilibrium, intermediate input prices ( ) 1 n 2 1 p ,..., p , p −  are exclusively determined by two 
parameters: n and 
T τ . 
 
Proof: The first order conditions for the optimal choice problem for the allocation of 






















































































Noticing that, in equilibrium, the left-hand side is the same in all equations and using 
the fact that the final good is the numéraire ( ) 1 pn = , this system can be transformed into 
one with  1 n −  equations in  1 n −  relative prices taking the form 
 
b p A =  
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By virtue of this equation, the structure of relative prices can be computed as 
 
( ) b A τ , n p p
1 T − = = ¶ 
 
To summarize, the structure of equilibrium relative prices depends on two parameters 
only: the number of sectors n determining array dimensions and the TT rate 
T τ  
























Proof: In the appendix. 
 
The above corollary is very helpful in illustrating the cascading effect of a transaction 
tax and the difference between it and conventional taxation. Let us focus for a moment on 
tax collections coming from taxing intermediate and final good purchases.
1 Tax 
collections involving intermediate input transactions amount to 









T H Z K p τ  while the tax collection on transactions involving the 





T H Z K p τ
− ⋅ ⋅ . In equilibrium, the total tax 
revenue relative to the economy’s GDP, or the effective tax rate 
T









e p τ τ  
 
which, based on proposition 2 and its corollary, depends exclusively on the number of 
sectors and the transaction tax rate. A closed-form expression relating effective and 



















                                                           
1 In this example tax collections coming from taxing factor service payments are not taken into 
consideration. In fact, these correspond to the value-added tax feature of a transaction tax, and therefore, 
they are irrelevant for illustrating the cascading effect of a transaction tax. Yet, for completeness and future 
reference, see next footnote. 
2 If, in addition, taxes on factor service payments are included, the corresponding tax collection amounts to 
() ( ) ∑ = + ⋅
n
1 i i i
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Figure 1 displays the relationship between 
T
e τ  and 
T τ  for alternative values of n, 
{} 20 , 10 , 5 , 1 n = . The  1 n = -line may be interpreted as the case of conventional taxation 
where taxes are levied on final output (i.e. equivalent to a proportional income tax). A 
0.3% nominal tax rate on final output yields revenue equal to exactly 0.3% of GDP (this 
should be a  ° 45  line), hence effective and nominal rates are equal. When intermediate 
transactions are taxed () 1 n >  a wedge between effective and nominal rates appears. In 
this case, the line in the ( )
T
e
T τ , τ -plane rotates counterclockwise and the wedge increases 
as the transaction and production structures turn more complex (i.e., as n increases). 
Thus, the overall tax burden expands. The same 0.3% nominal TT rate implies an 
effective tax rate of 0.9% when the number of production or transaction stages is 5, and 
of 1.64% and 3.12% when the number of stages are 10 and 20, respectively. The nominal 
tax rate indeed pyramids in our model economy. 
 
B. The Representative Household’s Problem 
 
So far, only the production side of the economy has been described. What follows is the 
description of how a transaction tax distorts trades in which households and firms interact 
by exchanging goods and factor services. The representative household’s problem is 
standard. The only minor difference is that households now have to provide capital and 
labor services to n production sectors in the economy. Following convention, lower case 
letters (except prices) represent variables under the household’s control while capital 
letters represent their aggregate, per capita counterparts. 
 
The representative household maximizes intertemporal utility by choosing time paths 
for consumption  t c , leisure  t l , labor supply  t , n t , 1 h , ... , h , investment  t , n t , 1 i ..., , i  and 
capital stocks  t , n t , 2 t , 1 k ..., , k , k , taking as given initial stocks of capital - assumed equal 




T T , τ . Mathematically, the household’s problem is formulated 
as choosing {}
∞







t l , c u β W 
 
This objective represents an intertemporal criterion to evaluate alternative time-dated 
streams of consumption and leisure where β  is a subjective discount factor and  () t t l , c u 
is an instantaneous utility function. The following parametric specification satisfies the 
requirements of a well-behaved utility function
3: 
 
() () t t t t l ln θ 1 c ln θ l , c u − + =  
 
                                                           
3 See King, et al. (1988).   10
where  () 1 , 0 θ∈  is a preference parameter. The household’s time endowment is 







t , i t 1 h l 
 



















Total labor income and capital income earned in the n production activities are used 
to finance investment and consumption expenditures as well as the payment of taxes on 
household outlays. Total tax payments are rebated back to households on a lump-sum 
basis, so that the government’s budget constraint is satisfied in every period. 
 
Capital stocks evolve over time according to the law of motion 
 
() n ..., , 1 i i k δ 1 k t , i 1 t , i t , i = + − = −  
 
where δ is a common constant depreciation rate. 
 
A system of () 2 n 4 +  equations describes the solution to the household’s problem. 
Notice, however, that capital and labor are perfectly mobile across sectors. This 
assumption implies that households will allocate the same number of work hours and 
capital to each sector. As a result, the dimensionality of the problem can be substantially 
reduced since it is isomorphic to one with one sector. 
 
C. Endogenous Growth 
 
Endogenous growth is shored up with an externality effect. Since the empirical literature 
does not seem to privilege a particular source of technical change, four possible 
alternative mechanisms for engendering sustained growth are appraised. Three invoke the 
existence of a human capital accumulation process in which learning may come from 
work experience (learning by working), or investment experience (learning by investing) 
or production experience (learning by producing). The remaining one invokes a pure 
positive externality (Romer, 1986) in which disembodied knowledge is represented by 
the aggregate capital stock. Formally, 















































Z H η exp
Z 
 
where  H η ,  I η  and  Y η  are given constants. Showing that the growth rate of the economy 
is determined by the pace of human capital accumulation,  1 t t t Z Z η − = , where  t η  is the 
economy’s gross rate of growth, is simple. Taxation, through its distortionary effect on 
allocations, may affect the long term growth path of the economy. The economy is non-
stationary as knowledge can be accumulated without bound. To induce stationarity the 
common trend is removed by dividing all growing variables by  t Z . The symbol ^ 































k ˆ = = = = =  
 
The transformed economy possesses a well-defined steady state. With logarithmic 
preferences there is no need to transform the subjective discount factor. 
 
D. The Competitive Equilibrium 
 
The competitive equilibrium of a multisector economy with a transaction tax can be 
defined as follows. 
 
Definition. A competitive equilibrium for a given fiscal policy { }
∞
=0 t t
T T ˆ , τ  and a fixed 
number of sectors n, is a collection of sequences of relative prices of intermediate inputs 
{}
∞
= − 0 t t , 1 n t , 2 t , 1 p ..., , p , p , relative rental prices of primary inputs { }
∞
=0 t t t r , w , individual 
household decisions {}
∞
=0 t t , n t , 1 t , n t , 1 t , n t , 1 t k ˆ ..., , k ˆ , h , ... , h , i ˆ ..., , i ˆ , c ˆ , sectoral firm decisions 
{}
∞
=0 t t , n t , 1 t , n t , 1 H ..., , H , K ˆ ..., , K ˆ  and aggregate outcomes { }
∞
=0 t t t t t t η , K ˆ , H , I ˆ , C ˆ  such that the 
following conditions hold: 
1)  Given policies and prices, the sequence of individual decisions solves the 
representative household’s problem; 
2)  Given policies and prices, sectoral firms maximize after-tax profits given their 
technology and transaction constraints; 
3) Aggregate consistency is satisfied:  t t C ˆ c ˆ = ,  t
f
t t , i t , i t H nH nH nh h = = = = , 
t t , i t I ˆ i ˆ n i ˆ = = ,  t
f
t t , i t , i t K ˆ K ˆ n K ˆ n k ˆ n k ˆ = = = = ; 
4)  The government budget constraint is satisfied: 




























































p τ T ˆ  
 
5) Markets  clear. 
 
The perfect foresight stationary equilibrium is described by a dynamic, nonlinear, 
simultaneous equation system involving an infinite set of equations with an infinite 
number of unknowns 
 
( ) ∞ = = + + + − ..., , 0 t 0 τ , n | η , η , r , r , w , H , I ˆ , C ˆ , C ˆ , K ˆ , K ˆ g
T
1 t t 1 t t t t t 1 t t t 1 t   
1 K ˆ
−  given 
∞ < ∞ → t t K ˆ lim   
 
In principle, the period t  system  () ⋅ g  includes Euler equations, market clearing 
conditions, material balances, budget constraints, laws of motion and any other condition 




t t C ˆ τ 1 H 1 w
θ 1
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δ 1 K ˆ + − =


















I ˆ C ˆ η exp
I ˆ η exp
H η exp
η         ( S Y S . 5 )  





































































































     ( S Y S . 7 )    
 
In the pure externality growth model an additional equilibrium condition replaces 
(SYS.5):  t , 1 K ˆ
t ∀ = , in which case the law of motion for the capital stock (SYS.4) 
provides an expression for the economy’s endogenous growth rate. 
 
E. Introducing Conventional Taxation 
 
Now generalize the preceding multisector economy by introducing conventional taxation. 
In addition to a transaction tax, the government may also resort to other distortionary but 
better known taxes: a consumption tax at rate of 
C τ , a labor income tax at rate 
W τ  and a 
capital income tax at rate of 
K τ . The introduction of these new taxes does not change the 
set-up on the production side of the economy. At this time, the budget constraint of the 
representative household is 
 
() () ( ) () t
n
1 i t





1 t , i
t
K
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where the capital income tax base is factor income less depreciation and lump-sum 
transfer payments are redefined to include the rebate of the total tax revenue. 
 
The period t  system of equations describing the equilibrium of the economy with the 
new tax structure is identical to  () ⋅ g  except in the first two equations which are now 
 
() () ( )
t W
C T
t t C ˆ
τ 1



























































1 t      (SYS.2´) 
 
By taking a look at how different taxes enter the system, it can be observed that a 
transaction tax behaves partly like a combination of conventional taxes, i.e.,   14
consumption, labor earnings and capital income taxes performing simultaneously. 
However, the distortionary effect of a transaction tax goes beyond the combination of 
traditional taxes. In contrast to conventional taxes, a TT distorts further allocations by 
treating depreciation allowances as taxable income (SYS.2´) and by driving a wedge of 
inefficiency between rental prices and marginal productivities ((SYS.6) and (SYS.7)) 
thus affecting primary factor pricing. The size of the wedge reflects the expanded tax 
burden associated with the degree of cascading. Is, then, transaction taxation more 
distortionary? It is not possible to provide an answer just by examining how a TT distorts 




3. CALIBRATION, COMPUTATION AND WELFARE CALCULATION 
 
This section describes the procedure used to select parameter values, the solution method 
to compute dynamic allocations of an infinite-horizon general equilibrium model and the 
metric employed for welfare comparisons among economies with alternative tax regimes. 
 
A. Parameter Calibration 
 
The benchmark parameterization is based on data from Brazil, which is the largest 
economy in the region with a bank debit tax currently in effect. Sensitivity analysis is 
also performed to check for robustness to alternative parameterizations built on data from 
other countries that have resorted to this type of unconventional tax. 
 
The parameterization procedure picks parameter values so as to equate Brazilian 
average aggregate variables to equivalent magnitudes for the steady state of the model 
economy. Table 1 details the Brazilian information required to calibrate all parameter 
values. In general, aggregate target variables are calculated as averages of time series 
over the 1972-1993 period, before the introduction of the bank debit tax into the tax code 
in 1993-94. Thus, benchmark parameter choices imply that the model economy’s steady 
state and the Brazilian economy prior to the introduction of a transaction tax will share 
the same capital-GDP ratio, consumption-GDP ratio, capital income tax-GDP ratio, labor 
income tax-GDP ratio, consumption tax-GDP ratio, real rate of return, growth rate, etc. 
The model is calibrated so that the length of a model period is one year. 
 
Before proceeding further, notice that an important parameter in the model, n, the 
number of production sectors which in turn determines the degree of tax pyramidation, is 
calibrated differently. Using the expression given in footnote 2 where the left-hand side is 
renamed as TRO  - transaction tax revenue to output ratio - yields a nonlinear equation in 
n if information on 






















+ = +  
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This information is taken from Kirilenko and Summers (2003). They report that in 
2001 Brazil’s bank debit tax yield was 1.45% of GDP with a statutory tax rate of 0.37%. 
Figure 2 depicts this simple rootfinding problem. The equation has two roots, being 
5 n ≈  the economically meaningful one. Again, sensitivity analysis will be conducted to 
assess how results are affected by more complex transaction environments. 
 
From the steady state version of the law of motion of the aggregate capital stock, 
equation (SYS.4), an expression for the rate of depreciation of the stock of physical 
capital  is obtained:  ( ) () ()
ss η KOR COR 1 1 1 δ ⋅ − − − = , where  1 η
ss −  is the steady state 
growth rate of per capita GDP, COR  is the consumption-output ratio and KOR  is the 
capital-output ratio. The rate of growth of per capita GDP is evaluated at 2.22% which 
corresponds to the average value calculated for the 1972-1993 sample using World Bank 
data on GDP and population. From the same database and for the same time period, 
COR  is estimated at 73.6%. KOR  is fixed at 2.68 which corresponds to the average 
ratio for the 1972-1990 period using Dhareshwar and Nehru’s (1993) data. Thus, δ is set 
at 7.84%. 
 
Using time series of the Selic rate (return on government bonds) for 1980-2000, 
Kanczuk (2002) finds that the real interest rate is close to 8% (1.9% on a quarterly basis). 
This estimate is taken as proxy for the economy’s real rate of return RRR . The real rate 
of return and the marginal product of capital are related simply as  δ r RRR
ss − = . This 
along with (SYS.6) yields an expression for the capital’s share in output, 
() ( )
ss η KOR δ RRR α ⋅ + = . α is then set equal to 41.55%. 
K τ  is set to 5.57% since, by 
definition,  () KOR RRR KRO τ
K ⋅ =  where KRO is the ratio of capital income tax to 
output. KRO is calculated as the average ratio of taxes on corporate income, profits and 
capital gains and nominal GDP for the 1980-1993 period. The sources for tax data are the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database and the IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics (GFS) database. Nominal GDP is taken from World Bank data. The 
level of government on which tax revenue data is based is what the IMF defines as 
“consolidated central government.” In addition, equation (SYS.2´) delivers an expression 
to compute β , ( ) ( ) RRR τ 1 1 β η
K ss ⋅ − + = . This implies  95 . 0 β = . 
 






































Values for average tax rates included in the preceding expression are computed from 
accounting identities, i.e.,  COR CRO τ
C =  and  ( ) α 1 WRO τ
W − =  where CRO stands 
for the average collection of consumption taxes relative to GDP and WRO represents a 
similar ratio for labor income tax revenue. The definition of consumption taxes 
corresponds to domestic taxes on goods and services in the GFS database while that of   16
labor income taxes corresponds to the sum of taxes on individual income, profits and 
capital gains and social security contributions, both of which (taxes and contributions) 
are interpreted as being levied mainly on labor income. Hence, 
C τ  is set equal to 7.67% 
and 
W τ  to 14.79%. Finally, Ellery et al. (2002), using the National Survey by Household 
Sample, find that, on average, Brazilian households spend  3 1  of their nonsleeping hours 
working, implying  33 . 0 H
ss = . Putting all pieces of  information together leads us to 
calculate  44 . 0 θ = . 
 
The four alternative growth models will exhibit exactly the same benchmark 
parameterization (with the obvious exception of the parameters in equation (SYS.5)) and 
associated steady state if the steady state capital stock is normalized to unity,  1 K ˆ ss = . 
Consistent with this normalization, steady state aggregate value added is computed as 
1 ss KOR Y ˆ − = , aggregate consumption as  
ss ss Y ˆ COR C ˆ ⋅ =  and investment as 
()
ss ss Y ˆ COR 1 I ˆ ⋅ − = . This normalization is at the cost of introducing a scale parameter S 
on the right-hand side of equations (SYS.3), (SYS.6) and (SYS.7), which is equivalent to 
redefining an aggregate value added function whose steady state version is 
() () ()
α 1 ss α ss ss ss H η K ˆ S n 1 Y ˆ
−
= . Set  58 . 3 S= . Further, the steady states of the marginal 
product of capital, 
ss r , and labor, 
ss w , can be obtained from (SYS.6) and (SYS.7) after 
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T → . 
 
The remaining parameters are estimated using equation (SYS.5). Set  066 . 0 ηH = , 
223 . 0 ηI =  and  059 . 0 ηY = , depending on the growth model being considered. Table 2 
summarizes the exact values selected for each of the model parameters following the 
described parameterization strategy as well as the associated steady state, henceforth 
referred to as baseline or initial steady state. By construction, both parameter values and 
the initial steady state are assumed to reflect, whenever possible, features of the economy 
prior to the introduction of a transaction tax ( ) 0 τ
T = , including the pre-existing tax 
structure. 
 
B. Solution Method 
 
The computation of perfect foresight equilibrium paths of economic variables in our 
dynamic general equilibrium model is a difficult task because current and future variables 
are linked and endogenously determined, generating an infinite-dimensional system of 
nonlinear equations. 
 
To reduce the complexity of the problem, by converting it into a finite-dimensional 
one, a solution method that exploits the structure of the economy to truncate the domain 
of the system is used. The solution method employed is somewhat related to Cooley and 
Hansen’s (1992). This particular solution method seems appropriate given the scope of 
the paper. The experiments in the next section are aimed at assessing the effect of various   17
tax reforms on resource allocation. To evaluate these responses, transition paths of the 
economy from the initial steady state (given in Table 2) to final steady states 
characterized by alternative tax structures are required. 
 
The solution algorithm is as follows. In the first step, the system (SYS) is linearized 
around the final steady state and solved for the recursive equilibrium law of motion and 
decision rules using the generalized Schur form or QZ decomposition of a matrix pencil 
following Klein’s (2000) method. In the second step, it is assumed that T periods after 
having introduced a tax reform, the economy is in the neighborhood of the final steady 
state. As a result, from that moment on the motion of the economy is properly described 
by linear rules. Using 
ss
0 K ˆ K ˆ =  as an initial condition and the linear decision rules (for 
T C ˆ ,  T r  and  T η ) as terminal or transversality conditions, the transition path of the 
economy from  1 t =  to  T t =  can be computed by solving a finite but possibly large 
nonlinear system of equations 
 
( ) T ..., , 1 t , 0 τ , τ , τ , τ , n | η , η , r , r , w , H , I ˆ , C ˆ , C ˆ , K ˆ , K ˆ g
T K W C
1 t t 1 t t t t t 1 t t t 1 t = = + + + −  
 
After period T, equilibrium paths are computed with the help of the law of motion and 
decision rules. Assume  100 T = . 
 
C. Welfare Cost of a Tax Reform 
 
Under the benchmark parameterization and corresponding initial steady state, if the 
baseline tax structure ( ) ( ) % 0 %, 6 . 5 %, 8 . 14 %, 7 . 7 τ , τ , τ , τ
T K W C =  remains unchanged, it 
can be shown that the steady state level of welfare equals
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ss ss ss ss η ln θ
β 1
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This is the reference value against which the welfare cost of alternative tax reforms 
will be assessed. Specifically, along the transition path from the initial steady state to the 
final one, the welfare cost of a tax reform is calculated as the value of λ  that solves the 
following nonlinear equation: 
 


















1 =  and the superscript τ identifies the economy’s equilibrium allocations 
along a transition path of 2000 periods under the effect of the alternative tax regime 
                                                           
4 This expression is the result of an infinite sum of constant terms. The appropriately adjusted sum over 
2000 periods only yields the same total. In deriving this expression, it is assumed, without loss of 
generality, that  1 Z1 = .   18
introduced in year  1 t =  and kept constant thereafter. 
τ
t Y ˆ λ⋅  is interpreted as a 
consumption gift, as a compensation, in terms of consumption, required to make the 
household as well off under the alternative regime τ as under the baseline tax structure. 
The consumption compensation is rescaled and expressed as percentage of distorted 
output (distorted under the new regime), as λ . 
 
 
4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
Experiment 1. Kirilenko and Summers (2003) report on the productivity of banking 
transaction taxes in various Latin American countries in effect since 1989. Excluding 
Ecuador, where the transaction tax was originally intended to replace income taxes and, 
for that reason, debit and credit transactions were both taxed and the statutory rate as well 
as the amount of revenue collected were atypically large, the yield of the tax has not 
surpassed 1.6% of GDP in the region. In Brazil, revenues are in the range of 0.80% to 
1.45% of GDP. The first experiment conducted in this section evaluates growth and 
welfare effects of a reform of the baseline tax structure directed at raising additional 
revenue for a comparable amount - say equal to 2% of GDP under the steady state of an 
alternative regime - changing one tax instrument at a time. Notice that in the final steady 
state the total tax revenue, as a percent of GDP, amounts to: 
% 49 . 17 WRO CRO KRO % 2 = + + +  for all model economies. Results are reported in 
Table 3. 
 
Panel A of Table 3 shows long-term welfare costs obtained from comparing 
allocations in the final and initial steady states.
5 Panel B reports welfare costs computed 
along a path of 2000 periods in the transition from initial to final steady states. Costs 
along the transitional path are lower than steady state costs because along the way toward 
the new steady state, households adjusts consumption and leisure plans upwards, hence 
ameliorating welfare costs, in order to deliver lower capital stock, consumption and work 
effort for the new long-term growth path as a consequence of higher taxation. The 
exception is the economy with Romer’s (1986) growth engine where transitional and 
steady state costs are identical. This result simply reflects the fact that that model has no 
transitional dynamics. Right after a tax reform is introduced, the economy converges to 
its new balanced growth path. As in Ortigueira’s (1998) model, an implausibly large rate 
of convergence like this one renders unrealistically high growth and welfare costs of 
taxation. Finally, long-term rates of growth under alternative tax regimes are reported in 
the last panel. 
 
Independently of the mechanism engendering endogenous growth, the cheapest way to 
raise the required revenue, not only in terms of welfare costs but also in terms of forgone 
                                                           
5 In this case λ  solves the following equation: 
 
() () ()
ss τ τ τ τ W η ln θ
β 1
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growth, is to use a consumption tax. For instance, the welfare cost of raising additional 
revenue equal to 2% of GDP (and rebated back - along with the rest of tax revenue - to 
households as a lump-sum transfer) is 0.83% of GDP when transitional dynamics are 
ignored and when growth is driven by work experience. This cost falls to 0.67% of GDP 
if the transition is taken into account. The effect on the endogenous long-term growth 
rate is negligible. It falls 4 basis points, from 2.22% in the benchmark steady state to 
2.18% under the new tax structure. The exact opposite, the most expensive instrument for 
raising additional revenue, is a tax on capital income, except in the transitional dynamics 
of an economy with a work experience externality driving the human capital 
accumulation process, where a labor income tax turns out to be more damaging. 
 
In contrast to claims that theory and empirical evidence amply substantiate its highly 
distortionary status, Table 3 shows that a transaction tax imposes an intermediate level of 
distortions. In some cases, it is the best option after a consumption tax since it causes 
lower welfare costs than a labor income tax, as in the transitional paths of model 
economies with human capital technologies driven by work and production experience 
externalities. Interestingly, in all model specifications, the growth toll of a transaction tax 
is small, even comparable to that of a consumption tax. 
 
To present a broader perspective, the same type of information - welfare costs and 
growth losses - is summarized in Figure 3 where targets for additional government 
revenue fluctuate between 1% and 10% of GDP. The figure shows that the relative 
ordering of taxes according to their distortionary capabilities does not generally change 
when revenue requirements are different from 2% of GDP. Relative to the ordering 
offered by Table 3, only one ordering change is uncovered in Figure 3. When additional 
revenue requirements are low (2% of GDP for instance) the model with a work 
experience externality shows that a tax on capital earnings is less distortionary than a TT 
along the transition path. However, with higher revenue requirements, transaction 
taxation becomes relatively less distortionary. 
 
Regarding growth effects, results in Figure 3 lend support to Harberger’s (1964) 
superneutrality conjecture (see also Mendoza et al., 1997) according to which, tax 
reforms around the current tax structure have small or negligible effects on long-term 
growth. Harberger argues that fiscal policy is superneutral in the sense that this type of 
reform cannot increase (reduce) the economy’s rate of growth more than 0.1 or 0.2 of a 
percentage point. This conclusion is consistent with Figure 3. Let us look at an extreme 
case. According to Figure 3, the highest growth sacrifice (difference between initial and 
final steady state growth rates) is produced by capital income taxation in an economy 
with human capital accumulation driven by an investment experience externality. If, in 
this model economy, the baseline capital earnings tax rate increases by 10 percentage 
points
6 (from 5.57% to 15.57%), tax revenues increase by 2.27% of GDP and the long-
term growth rate falls by only 0.23 of a percentage point - from 2.22% to 1.99% - very 
close to Harberger’s figures. Reported results show that transaction taxation is not an 
                                                           
6 Mendoza et al. (1997) use reforms of a similar magnitude to assess Harberger’s superneutrality 
conjecture.   20
exception to Harberger’s superneutrality conjecture. In all model specifications, similar 
amounts of additional revenue raised with a transaction tax induce very small effects on 
growth. 
 
Experiment 2. The benefits of giving up taxing transactions as recommended by Tanzi 
(2000), IMF (2000) and Coelho et al. (2001) are assessed in Experiment 2. This 
experiment also sheds light on the empirical backing which justifies the popular policy 
advice to speedily abandon this tax - the claim that the longer the life span of transaction 
taxation is, the higher its costs will be (see Tanzi, 2000; Coelho et al., 2001; Kirilenko 
and Summers, 2003). 
 
Current well-known fiscal solvency concerns preclude user countries from simply 
renouncing much needed revenue. In consequence, a sensible policy experiment is to 
replace TT revenue with other sources. To that end, a two-step tax reform is designed. In 
period  1 t =  the baseline tax structure is reformed by introducing a transaction tax that 
generates additional revenue equal to 2% of GDP under the new steady state. Then, in 
period  10 t = , which roughly corresponds to the current life span of the Brazilian 
transaction tax, the government pushes through a new reform which scrapes transaction 
taxation and increases existing rates on consumption, labor income or capital earnings 
taxes (one tax at a time) aimed at raising the required additional revenue under the newer 
steady state. 
 
There are two possible approaches to modeling this nonstationary policy in our perfect 
foresight environment. First, though agents are endowed with perfect foresight, the 
government announces an unanticipated two-step reform at the beginning of period  1 t = . 
From then on, agents are fully aware of the trajectory of the tax system and temporariness 
of transaction taxation. The announcement of future policy changes (those planned for 
year  10 t = ) does not give rise to credibility concerns. This case is referred to hereafter as 
the “one shot case.” The second approach is the following. At the beginning of period 
1 t =  the government passes an unanticipated reform introducing a transaction tax which 
is expected to stay forever. A few years later, at the beginning of period  10 t = , the 
government again surprises everyone by abandoning transaction taxation and replacing 
its proceeds with revenue from other tax instruments. This case is referred to as the “two-
shot case” and comes closer to the set-up related to embracing current policy 
recommendations. 
 
Based on a model economy with a work experience externality engendering 
endogenous growth and where a consumption tax is brought on as substitute for 
transaction taxation in period  10 t = , the transition paths of capital stock, investment, 
work effort, consumption, rate of growth, wage, marginal product of capital and output 
are depicted in Figure 4 under the two alternative approaches to modeling the specified 
two-step tax reform. As a point of reference, the figure also plots (dotted lines) transition 
paths associated with a reform introducing, a permanent consumption tax from the 
beginning () 1 t = , hence avoiding transaction taxation, which, according to the results in 
Experiment 1, is the cheapest way to raise the required additional revenue within the   21
class of one-step stationary reforms. As mentioned above, the welfare cost of this 
reference policy is 0.67% of GDP (Table 3, panel B). Is there still room for transaction 
taxation given that consumption taxation is less costly? 
 
When the two-step tax reform is implemented in one shot (first column of Figure 4), 
the economy, relative to the reference economy, exhibits higher capital and work effort 
and, as a result, higher economic activity and growth. The welfare cost of using 
transaction taxation during 10 periods and then replacing it with a higher consumption 
tax rate, as expected from period  1 t = , is only 0.46% of GDP. This implies that the 
positive effects of consumption and growth on welfare outweigh the negative effect of 
reduced leisure along the transition path. When transaction taxation is scrapped 
unexpectedly, i.e., when the two-step reform is implemented in two shots (second column 
of Figure 4), the behavior of the economy is very different. Relative to the reference case, 
the economy enjoys higher leisure, which is good for current welfare but bad for growth, 
and capital and output are lower. The welfare cost of this policy is 0.74% of GDP. The 
abandonment policy then brings some welfare gains since maintaining a transaction tax 
forever costs 0.85% of GDP (Table 3, panel B). 
 
To assess the robustness of these results, further experiments were conducted using 
alternative tax revenue substitutes, endogenous growth models and transaction taxation 
life spans (from 0  to 20 years). The corresponding welfare costs are shown in Figure 5. 
In each plot there are two horizontal lines. The upper one measures the cost of using 
solely transaction taxation to raise the required additional revenue from the start ( ) 1 t =  
while the lower one measures the cost of using consumption taxation instead. The 
remaining lines show the welfare costs of temporarily using a transaction tax and, at 
some point (from 0 to 20 years), switching to an increased consumption, labor income 
and capital income tax. In the case of two-step reforms implemented in two shots (third 
column), it is important to notice that the transitional cost of using a TT depends on how 
TT revenues are restored. It is only in the case where these revenues are replaced with 
consumption tax revenues that we can be certain that a scrapping policy is welfare 
improving and that the benefit of the policy decreases with the duration of transaction 
taxation. However, when transaction taxation is replaced with a capital income tax, the 
scrapping policy generally worsens social welfare and, in that case, it is better to keep 
transaction taxation for as long as possible. In the case of labor income taxation, results 
are mixed and depend on the type of mechanism generating endogenous growth. 
 
The welfare costs of two-step tax reforms implemented in one shot describe a U-
shaped curve (something not observed in the short horizon of Figure 5, second column) 
as the duration of transaction taxation is prolonged. If a government can credibly commit 
itself to abandoning transaction taxation by a certain date in the future, even in the long-
term future, for example, 20 years or so, a government financing policy that temporarily 
uses transaction taxation is less costly than one that finances the required additional 
revenue by resorting exclusively to a consumption tax. As a generalization, regardless of 
how TT revenue is replaced and regardless of the growth engine, the welfare cost of any 
financing policy that involves transaction taxation will eventually fall below the lower 
horizontal line (not completely shown in Figure 5 for all taxes) for quite a while. In   22
summary, for suitably long TT life spans, society will be better off temporarily using a 
transaction tax under nonstationary policies than under one-step stationary policies. 
 
 
5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
Additional robustness checks are conducted in this section. Information for Argentina, 
Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru is given in Table 4 to experiment with other 
plausible parameter choices. Using information on TT rates and revenue collections, the 
calibrated number of production sectors for these countries is lower than the benchmark 
figure. Lower n, specifically  2 n = , is associated with only small changes in welfare 
costs and negligible growth effects. 
 
Furthermore, it has been shown that theory (equation in footnote 2) imposes a 
constraint relating n, 
T τ  and the amount of revenue collected as a share of GDP. If it is 
deemed that there is no sizeable measurement error in tax collection ratios, theory helps 
us by pinning down a relationship between the other two less precisely measured 
magnitudes. All pairs ( )
T τ , n  satisfying  ( ) { } 0 τ , 1 n : τ , n
T T > >  as well as being consistent 
with a given TT collection ratio (1.45% of GDP as in the baseline calibration) deliver 
exactly the same allocations in both experiments under consideration, and therefore, the 
same welfare and growth assessments. In this sense, results are robust under alternative, 
more complex, transaction structures. In other words, relative to the benchmark 
calibration, any higher n requires a lower 
T τ  to yield the same observed revenue ratio 
and their effects fully offset each other. 
 
The relatively high level of taxation in Brazil is also underscored in Table 4. Brazilian 
tax ratios are cut in half in the next sensitivity test to approximate the aggregate tax 
burden observed in Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru prior to the introduction of a 
TT. The effect of a lower preexisting tax burden is to reduce the welfare costs of raising 
additional revenue (equal to 2% of GDP). The reduction is between 11% and 14% on 
average for consumption, capital income and transaction taxes and 24% on average for a 
labor income tax (excluding the model with Romer’s (1986) growth mechanism from the 
analysis). The effect on the long-term growth rate remains next to nil for all tax 
instruments and growth models. No major qualitative changes are revealed in transitional 
dynamics nor in the relative distortionary attributes of the tax instruments. 
 
Nor are results sensitive to the time span assumed for an economy to come close to its 
new steady state after a tax reform is passed. The same results are obtained if  50 T =  
years or  200 T =  is assumed. 
 
 
6. COMPARING RESULTS WITH THE LITERATURE 
 
An effort is made in this section to “square the circle” by reconciling the differences 
between the results in this paper and the strikingly opposing conclusions drawn from the   23
existing literature. The existing empirical literature on bank debit taxation in Latin 
America is briefly reviewed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Lozano and Ramos (2000) and Coelho et al. (2001) report anecdotal evidence on the 
allocational effects of a tax on financial transactions. They conjecture, and sometimes 
document, a myriad of potentially distortionary effects on activities such as foreign 
exchange, securities and interbank market transactions, the payment system operation, 
financial intermediation, monetary aggregates (currency outside banks), underground 
economy, etc. In addition, Koyama and Nakane (2001) provide econometric evidence for 
Brazil on the effect of a financial transaction tax on financial intermediation (number of 
written checks, M1, term deposits and bank intermediation spreads). Overall, this 
evidence vividly illustrates the point that a financial transaction tax is indeed 
distortionary. However, the quantitative question of how important these distortionary 
effects are is left unanswered. The policy recommendation that a bank debit tax should be 
sidestepped or soon replaced with superior taxes such as the VAT and income taxes 
(Coelho, et al., 2001) constitutes a non sequitur. 
 
Interpreting a tax on bank debits as an excise tax on financial intermediation, 
Albuquerque (2001a) and Kirilenko and Summers (2003) measure the deadweight 
welfare loss associated with this type of taxation using Harberger’s triangle method. The 
former calculates a deadweight loss of 27% of the revenue collected for Brazil while the 
latter computes deadweight losses of 30% for Venezuela, 35% for Colombia, 45% for 
Ecuador and nil for Brazil. Though interesting, this evidence about the absolute level of 
distortions is not enough to dismiss bank debit taxation. With a different analytical 
approach (dynamic general equilibrium where tax proceeds are rebated back to 
households), the conclusions in this paper are based on much higher welfare losses. For 
the benchmark case of Brazil and when growth is driven by a work experience 
externality, the welfare cost of a transaction tax amounts to 43% (0.85%/2%) of the 
revenue collected. It comes to 86% (1.71%/2%), 49% (0.97%/2%) and 306% (6.12/2%) 
of collected revenue depending on whether the growth engine is an investment 
externality, a production externality or Romer’s (1986) mechanism. 
 
Albuquerque (2001b) develops a dynamic general equilibrium framework to study the 
economic effects of a tax on bank debits in Brazil.
7 Unfortunately, instead of using the 
model to derive quantitative implications, the author estimates an ad hoc regression of the 
revenue productivity, defined as the revenue to GDP ratio divided by the TT rate, against 
the statutory TT rate. He, then, computes welfare triangles as in Albuquerque (2001a). 
 
Finally, it is interesting to compare the relationship between the TT revenue as a share 
of GDP and the TT rate obtained for Brazil using Albuquerque’s (2001a, b) econometric 
estimates
8 and the same relationship derived from the theoretical model of section 2 
                                                           
7 For completeness, Arbeláez et al. (2002) wrongly claim that their appraisal of the bank debit tax in 
Colombia is based on a general equilibrium model. They offer simple back-of-the-envelope calculations 
showing an obvious feature: that the nominal rate of a bank debit tax, akin to a turnover tax, may pyramid. 
But no evidence is offered showing that this has been the case.  
8 Using Albuquerque’s estimates the relation is given by   24
(equation in footnote 2, for  5 n =  and  7 n = ). According to Figure 6 the behavior of the 
observed Brazilian TT collection closely corresponds to what theory predicts. If 
Albuquerque’s partial equilibrium approach had been pursued in this paper, roughly the 
same welfare losses would have been obtained.
9 
 
In summary, though theory has argued that a non-neutral tax may be potentially highly 
distortionary, the existing empirical evidence has been unable to substantiate that claim. 
 
 
7. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Despite the attractiveness and popularity of views claiming that a bank debit tax as a 
means of collecting government revenue is very costly for society, thus far empirical 
work has failed to provide support for that conjecture. The question is tackled in this 
paper by developing a multisector dynamic general equilibrium model that allows for the 
pyramidation of the nominal tax rate, the major drawback of a non-neutral tax. The 
model is used to examine the efficiency implications of a bank debit tax, understood here 
as a general transaction tax, from a quantitative standpoint; or equivalently, it is assumed 
that all transactions in the economy are channeled through the banking system and there 
subject to a bank debit tax. An important aspect of the model is that conventional 
(consumption, labor income and capital income) taxes can be evaluated and compared 
with non-neutral taxes on an equal footing. 
 
The findings in this paper manifestly contrast with the existing literature. The results 
suggest that a transaction tax is not an especially distortionary tax. It introduces lower 
distortions than a capital earnings tax and, in some cases, depending on the growth 
engine, lower than a labor income tax. The model shows that a consumption tax is clearly 
the least distorting instrument. Though a fiscal policy that chooses a consumption tax 
instead of a transaction tax to raise the required additional revenue will reap the rewards 
of relatively large efficiency gains, no improvement in the rate of economic growth 
should be expected. So, the question is whether there is still room for transaction taxation 
when governments can use a consumption tax, which is the “(…) premier indirect tax 
from a technical point of view” (Harberger, 1990), instead. This study demonstrates that 
a government financing policy that temporarily uses transaction taxation and 
subsequently replaces it with an alternative conventional tax is superior in terms of 
welfare to any other financing policy that avoids transaction taxation and resorts to a 
conventional tax to raise the required revenue from the outset. This result depends on the 
government announcing the two-step tax reform from the outset and credibly committing 
to it. Finally, the benefits of scrapping transaction taxation as recommended by many 
analysts are assessed in the paper. The fact that the benefit of the policy hinges on how 
TT revenue is replaced is also shown. It is only in the case where these revenues are 
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9 The reason is that deadweight losses depend on the slope of the depicted relation. Notice that intercepts 
are zero.   25
replaced with consumption tax revenues that the TT scrapping policy is welfare 
improving and where the delay in implementing such a recommendation is costly for 
society. If the substitute is a capital income tax, the scrapping policy worsens social 
welfare and, in that case, it is better to keep transaction taxation for as long as possible. 
 
Extending the model to relax some of the assumptions made to obtain a tractable 
framework seems an interesting avenue for future research. Alternative transaction and 
production structures, with the number of sectors being determined endogenously in 
response to incentives to economize on transactions through vertical integration, should 
throw further light on our understanding of transaction taxation.   
 
   26
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APPENDIX: Proof of Corollary 
 
The system of first order conditions used in the proof of Proposition 2 can be transformed into one 
involving  1 n −  equations in n  relative prices ( ) n 2 1 p , , p , p K  
( ) 1 1
T
2 p p τ 1 p = + −  
( ) 1 2
T
3 p p τ 1 p = + −  
( ) 1 3
T
4 p p τ 1 p = + −  
…  
( ) 1 1 n
T
n p p τ 1 p = + − −  
From the first equation note that  2 p  can be expressed in terms of  1 p . Using this result and the second 
equation,  3 p  can be written in terms of  1 p  too. Following this procedure with the rest of equations,  all 
relative prices can be expressed in terms of  1 p . In particular, the relation between  n p  and  1 p  is given by 
() () () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
T 2 n T 3 n T 3 T 2 T T
n p τ 2 τ 1 τ 1 ... τ 1 τ 1 τ 1 1 p
  
   + + + + + + + + + + + + =
− −
 




T p n p p τ − = ∑
−
=  



















⋅ ⋅ + ⋅  on the 
summation of left-hand sides. Using the relation between  1 p  and  n p  and the fact that  1 pn = , you should 
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Figure 1 
Cascading Effect of a Transaction Tax 
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Figure 2 
Solving for n 
 




























   32
 
Figure 3 
Welfare and Growth Effects of Raising Additional Tax Revenue 
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Figure 4 
Resource Allocation in Two-Step Tax Reforms 
Endogenous Growth Model with a Work Experience Externality 
(% deviations from initial steady state and basis points for growth rates) 
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Figure 4 (continued) 
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Figure 5 
Welfare Costs of Two-Step Tax Reforms 
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Figure 6 
Comparing Results: Nominal and Effective Transaction Tax Rates 
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Table 1 
Brazil: Information Used in Benchmark Parameterization 
 
T τ   Statutory transaction tax rate  0.37% 
TRO   Transaction tax revenue to output ratio  1.45% 
KRO  Capital income tax revenue to output ratio  1.19% 
CRO  Consumption tax revenue to output ratio  5.65% 
WRO  Labor income tax revenue to output ratio  8.65% 
1 η
ss −   Rate of growth per capita GDP  2.22% 
ss H  Fraction of time devoted to work  33.3% 
COR   Consumption to output ratio  73.6% 
KOR   Capital to output ratio  2.68 
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Table 2 
Benchmark Parameter Values and Initial Steady State 
 
Benchmark Parameterization  Initial Steady State 
α  Capital’s share in output  0.4155  ss K ˆ   1 
β   Discount factor  0.9504  ss Y ˆ   0.3730 
δ  Depreciation rate  0.0784  ss H  0.3333 
θ  Preference parameter  0.4431  ss C ˆ   0.2746 
S  Scale parameter  3.5774  ss I ˆ   0.0984 
n  Number of sectors  5  ss η   1.0222 
C τ   Consumption tax rate  0.0767  ss r   0.1584 
W τ   Labor income tax rate  0.1479  ss w  0.6541 
K τ   Capital income tax rate  0.0557    
T τ   Transaction tax rate  0    
H η   Growth engine parameter  0.0658    
I η   Growth engine parameter  0.2229    
Y η   Growth engine parameter  0.0588      39
Table 3 
Welfare and Growth Effects of a Tax Reform Designed to Raise Additional 
Revenue Equal to 2% of GDP Under the New Steady State (one tax at a time) 
(% of GDP and %) 
 
  Endogenous Growth Mechanism 








A. STEADY STATE WELFARE COSTS 
Consumption tax  0.83  0.81  0.79  2.01 
Labor income tax  1.38  1.36  1.32  3.37 
Capital income tax  1.96  3.77  2.66  11.86 
Transaction tax  1.46  2.16  1.70  6.12 
        
B. WELFARE COSTS IN THE TRANSITION PATH 
Consumption tax  0.67  0.67  0.59  2.01 
Labor income tax  1.12  1.12  0.98  3.37 
Capital income tax  0.75  2.89  1.24  11.86  
Transaction tax  0.85  1.71  0.97  6.12 
        
C. STEADY STATE GROWTH RATES (benchmark: 2.22%) 
Consumption tax  2.18  2.18  2.18  2.06 
Labor income tax  2.16  2.16  2.16  1.95 
Capital income tax  2.19  2.02  2.12  1.27 
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Table 4 
Sensitivity Analysis: Information for Alternative Parameterizations 
 












T τ   0.37%  0.99% 0.30% 0.85%  1.60%  0.81% 
TRO   1.45%  1.08% 0.75% 1.57%  2.37%  0.57% 
KRO  1.19%  0.60% 2.37% 13.01% 5.67%  1.77% 
CRO  5.65%  3.69% 3.80% 1.30%  3.29%  7.03% 
WRO  8.65%  3.16% 2.63% 1.58%  NA  NA 
1 η
ss −   2.22% 0.11%  1.77%  Approx. 0%  3.74%  Approx. 0% 
ss H  33.3% 30.0%  NA  NA  NA  NA 
COR   73.6%  77.6% 81.7% 64.8%  78.3%  82.9% 
KOR   2.68  3.03 2.21 3.43  2.98  3.00 
RRR  8.00%  10.00% 10.00% NA  NA  10.30% 
Sources and Notes: 
NA: not available. 
Sources and methodology are as in the benchmark parameterization. For details see section 3.A. 
Parameter Calibration. Figures are generally calculated as averages over spans of 20-23 years 
preceding the introduction of bank debit taxation in each country. The different sources are the 
following. 
ss H  for Argentina is taken from Kydland and Zarazaga (2002). Real rates of return 
are taken from Kydland and Zarazaga (2002) for Argentina, Harberger (1973) for Colombia and 
Dancourt et al. (2002) for Peru.           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 